likely, the estimated social e¤ect will be the compound e¤ect of all or some of these. Separate identi…cation of di¤erent social e¤ects, i.e. of the channel through which social interactions operate, is only apparently of second order importance compared to identi…cation overall.
The separate identi…cation of di¤erent social e¤ects is important for policy evaluation because di¤erent channels of in ‡uence generally require di¤er-ent policies. Consider for example the literature on why "welfare cultures" emerge, i.e. which social factors a¤ect welfare participation. Information sharing and stigma are natural candidates-and have in fact received considerable attention in both research and policy circles. Suppose a policy-maker wants welfare programs to reach all individuals they are designed for, and wants to take actions in order to increase take-up rates (which are notoriously low in the US). The appropriate measures depend on the relative magnitude of stigma and information e¤ects. If stigma is the main cause of nonparticipation, then one could think of ways to "hide" recipiency-such as the replacement of food stamps with plastic cards. If instead information sharing is the main cause then one should think of ways to inform eligible nonparticipants. The point is that policies that work if one kind of social e¤ect is predominant may be ine¤ective if instead another kind is predominant.
However, even the most recent empirical works that identify social interactions in welfare participation, such as Bertrand et al. (2000) , do not attempt to identify them separately. An estimate of "aggregate" social interactions, despite being important, may be of limited use because without knowledge of the composition and/or source of the social e¤ect, one is hard pressed to make policy recommendations. The issue, which we label the con ‡ation problem, 2 was brought to light by Manski (2000) , and is a pressing one for empirical study of social interactions.
In this paper we suggest a simple and easily usable procedure to separately identify di¤erent kind of social interactions. 3 We manage separation of a compound social interactions e¤ect by exploiting the possibility that di¤erent reference groups are associated with di¤erent social e¤ects. The procedure allows for overlapping reference groups, as well as non-exclusive social e¤ects, in the sense that two or more groups can be the source of the same e¤ect. E¤ectively, we introduce an additional piece of sociological information with respect to existing work-that certain types of social interactions can be related with particular associations that a person might have. For instance, one might imagine that an individual shares information with his/her colleagues, but forms expectations about the outcome of certain actions (social learning) only considering the outcomes of individuals similar to himself/herself, and su¤ers social stigma from colleagues as well as neighbors and family. However, one does not need to interpret "distinct groups"
in a special sense. The procedure we suggest works if groups are spatially or temporally distinct, or both.
Our result is based on the fact that external information on the source of interactions can provide a basis for disentangling a compound e¤ect. As such, it is based on prior information. Sometimes the researcher has particular prior information that allows the discrimination among di¤erent social e¤ects, or to rule out a particular channel, in a simpler way than we suggest.
For instance, Mas and Moretti (2006) identify peer in ‡uences on individual productivity among cashiers at a large supermarket chain. Then they ingeniously use information on spatial orientation and location of registers to imply that the predominant social e¤ect is social pressure-that is, workers monitoring each other. In another context, Aizer and Currie (2004) identify network e¤ects in the use of publicly funded maternity services, based on panel data for …rst and second pregnancies. Subsequently, they devise a simple test arguing that if information is to be the predominant social e¤ect then the magnitude of total social e¤ects must be smaller for second deliveries. In the absence of particular information of this kind, one has to justify patterns of social in ‡uence on the basis of ethnographic 4 or sociological 5 evidence.
In the next section we outline our methodology in the context of a classic linear-in-means model of social interactions, and Section 3 concludes.
Econometric model
In this model, we allow individual to have multiple reference groups, a tool by which we will be able to distinguish di¤erent types of social e¤ects. We consider the simple case of two social e¤ects, labeled A and B, and two ref-
erence groups, labeled g and h. This case is not only analytically convenient, but is also frequently encountered in applications. 6 Our separation procedure works under two conditions: (i) the researcher can identify as many distinct reference groups in ‡uencing individual behavior as the number of social e¤ects to be identi…ed, in this case two, and (ii) each group is the source of at least one distinct e¤ect, but not all e¤ects. 7 For reasons to be clari…ed below, we will also require that when the same social e¤ect comes from di¤erent groups, the researcher has prior information on the importance of each such group as a possible source of social interactions of that given type.
Individuals choose an action !. We assume that individuals whose reference groups are g and h respond to the actions of other individuals in both groups 8 , but asymmetrically. Suppose that social interactions of type B occur within both groups, but that interactions of type A occur within group g lem because the researcher might be interested in estimating the "detailed" In the companion paper to this one (Cohen-Cole and Zanella, 2006), we hypothesize that the choice to participate in welfare is mediated by information and stigma e¤ects from one's own race-ethnic group at the local level but stigma e¤ects alone from the remainder of the community.
10 Identi…cation is a concern because mean behaviors are endogenous, i.e. m g = E (! i jY g ) and m h = E (! i jY h ), which is the source of the re ‡ection problem. E¤ectively, in order to focus on separate identi…cation, we assume this and other inferential problems (see Brock and Durlauf, 2001 ) have been solved. type B only in any group, (m g ; m h ). Therefore, since this function controls for e¤ect B, we can write another model in which, by construction, mean behavior in group g captures the e¤ect of interactions of type A only:
Estimating models (1) and (2), which we label respectively primary and auxiliary, it is possible to recover the detailed set of parameters as well as standard errors. For tractability, we specify the ( ) function as linear:
where J B gh has the structural interpretation of total e¤ect B from both groups g and h. The weights g and h are assumed known, and represent the importance of groups g and h for interactions of type B. Such weights could be, for instance, demographic weights 11 , and we discuss another possibility below. The linearity assumption may appear arbitrary, and in fact, there is nothing that mandates that the "total e¤ect B function" be a linear relationship. The solution, however, is more tractable in the linear form. To summarize, by construction the primary model includes g-group e¤ect for social reasons A; B and the h-group e¤ect for social reason B. The auxiliary model includes the g-group e¤ect for social reasons A alone and the joint g-and h-group e¤ect for social reason B alone. At this point, it may be useful to discuss an example underlying the social "reasons" above. As mentioned, the idea here is to use information on agent's response to distinct groups' average actions to unpack the composition of total social e¤ects.
Consider the case of student achievement, where ! measures test scores.
Allow g to refer to boys and h girls. Now we have a common linear-inmeans model with the exception that we have two endogenous coe¢ cients to estimate. 12 In many studies, readers are asked to assume that students respond to the e¤orts of other students in their decision to work hard themselves. Imagine, in this case that students respond both to the e¤orts of other students (A), but also to the social stigma associated with being studious (B). 13 To estimate this e¤ect, imagine that boys (girls) have knowledge of the amount of work done by other boys (girls) in their classroom, but don't know about the study habits of the other gender. However, the social penalty is imposed by all students in the class. Thus, from the perspective of a boy, we can interpret the primary equation (1) and the joint social penalty from both 12 Others have estimated more than one coe¢ cient in a social interactions context, though for varying purposes. See for example Conley and Topa (2002) . 13 It is well known that in many American schools, there is a social penalty of sorts for students to perform too well academically. See Akerlof and Kranton (2002) for a theoretical model. .
Rewrite primary and auxiliary models in matrix regression form using (4): 
Therefore, using (5), (6), and (7):
Furthermore, (7) reveals that \ (a; b; d) = \ ( ; ; ).
A corollary of Proposition 1 is that when one of the two models is assumed to be the "true model", the other one can be de…ned as true as well. This in turn implies that coe¢ cients are comparable across the primary and auxiliary model. Furthermore, we can rewrite the latter as follows:
The comparability of coe¢ cients across models (1) and (8) 
where one simply subtracts the social e¤ect A from the compound e¤ect within group g. Of course these two estimators are equivalent under our assumptions. To see this, compute marginal e¤ects from the primary and auxiliary regression equations:
whence
where denotes standard deviation. This provides a way to estimate J B g and its standard error in an univocal way, along with a useful speci…cation test: if the model is correctly speci…ed, then estimators (9) and (10) 
which are subject to the same caveat. Also notice that equation (14) mimics (11) and (12), which suggests our estimator is consistent with the structure of the model.
Conclusion
In this paper we have argued that when trying to estimate the e¤ect of social interactions on economic behavior, one needs to address explicitly the fact that di¤erent social e¤ects are possibly at work. As such, we presented a simple econometric method for the isolation of distinct social interactions in the linear-in-means model. This method is appropriate when the researcher has prior knowledge that a given group is a source of two social e¤ects, while a di¤erent-possibly partially overlapping-group is a source of only one of the two. Our opinion is that this method is well-suited to contexts in which there exists prior qualitative research that indicates distinction in social e¤ects at di¤erent layers of society.
